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Abstract
The U.S. financial system faces a crisis. Unlike fiscal crises, this one is of consumer confi-
dence and trust. Recent polls suggest that faith in American banks is at a forty-year low. Many
blame the banking sector for having a significant role in causing and exacerbating the financial
crisis of 2008, as well as the deep recession that has followed. Scandals, litigation, and a lack of
accountability for conduct that has breached the public trust mean that many consumers of bank
services are starting to call for greater transparency in banking practices, financial institutions
that are more responsive to community needs, and a broader array of alternatives to traditional
banks. Initiatives such as the Move Your Money campaign and Bank Transfer Day have captured
the imagination of many bank customers who are looking to use their consumer clout to support
financial institutions that are engaged in responsible practices. Perhaps as a way to counter this
crisis in confidence, regulators, local governments and consumers alike seek ways to measure
bank responsiveness to consumer wishes and community needs. This paper describes one such
tool: the Community Impact Report Card (“CIRC”). Modeled on other grading systems—such
as New York City’s method for grading restaurants—and informed by principles of behavioral
economics, CIRC is a tool designed to offer consumers a means through which they can easily
comparison shop between banks. This comparison is based on those banks’ effectiveness in meet-
ing consumer demand for accessible and inexpensive products and services, and is also meant to
encourage banks to strengthen the array of products and services they offer. By providing a range
of information about the products and services offered by local banks, and generating a single
score for each bank based on this information on a scale of 1–100, consumers will have an easily
accessible way to compare how each bank serving the community is generally responsive to local
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needs and interests. Flexible and adaptable, CIRC system is designed to be tailored to the needs
of local communities and to be applied to the array of financial institutions that serve them.
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New York City’s method for grading restaurants—and informed by 
principles of behavioral economics, CIRC is a tool designed to offer 
consumers a means through which they can easily comparison shop 
between banks.  This comparison is based on those banks’ 
effectiveness in meeting consumer demand for accessible and 
inexpensive products and services, and is also meant to encourage 
banks to strengthen the array of products and services they offer.  By 
providing a range of information about the products and services 
offered by local banks, and generating a single score for each bank 
based on this information on a scale of 1–100, consumers will have 
an easily accessible way to compare how each bank serving the 
community is generally responsive to local needs and interests.  
Flexible and adaptable, CIRC system is designed to be tailored to the 
needs of local communities and to be applied to the array of financial 
institutions that serve them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. financial system faces a crisis of consumer confidence.1  
According to recent polls, faith in American banks is at a forty-year 
low.2  Consumers and financial experts alike blame banks for causing 
the 2008 financial crisis and the deep recession that followed.  As a 
result, consumers are pushing for financial institutions to be more 
responsive to their needs, as well as seeking alternatives to the 
traditional banking sector.  Campaigns such as the Move Your Money 
project and Bank Transfer Day have captured the imagination of many 
customers who are looking to use their consumer clout to support more 
responsive—and responsible—financial institutions. 
As a way to counter this crisis in confidence, regulators, local 
governments, and consumers have attempted to measure bank 
responsiveness to consumer and community needs.  This paper describes 
one such measuring tool, the Community Impact Report Card (“CIRC”).  
CIRC was initially used to provide consumers with information about 
bank products and services in the city of New Haven, but it was 
designed to be replicable in any community. 
Community Impact Report Cards for all of New Haven’s consumer 
banks were published in October 2012 with the intent to create a 
dialogue between the New Haven community and the banks that serve 
it.  CIRC serves two distinct audiences: first, consumers can use the 
ratings to easily compare across banks.  By providing a range of 
information about bank products and practices, and generating a single 
score for each bank on a 100-point scale, consumers will be able to 
compare how each bank serves community needs.  Second, CIRC is also 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See, e.g., Dennis Jacobe, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Falls to Record 
Low, GALLUP (June 27, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/americans-
confidence-banks-falls-record-low.aspx. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 8–12. 
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targeted to banks themselves, as an impetus to strengthen their array of 
products and services.  In addition, CIRC serves a broader audience 
outside of New Haven; other communities are encouraged to use the 
CIRC methodology, while shaping and adapting the index to meet their 
own local needs. 
According to its proponents, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) was intended 
to restore the public’s trust in the financial system.3  However, more 
than two years since its passage, trust in the financial sector is at one of 
its lowest points in history.4  Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, 
combined with the bad publicity that has flowed from a series of more 
recent bank scandals, has left many consumers and communities feeling 
powerless to shape the behavior of financial institutions.5  In creating 
CIRC, our hope is that communities across the country will be able to 
shape and improve the behavior of the banks that serve them by offering 
consumers an easy means to assess the quality of the bank products and 
services available to them. 
Over the last forty years, legislators, banking officials, courts, and 
consumer advocates have attempted to rein in financial services 
practices that they deemed harmful to local communities. Whether 
through the passage of the Fair Lending Act in the 1960s, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the Community Reinvestment Act in the 
1970s, efforts to rein in predatory lending in the 2000s, or the 
introduction of so-called Responsible Banking Ordinances in local 
communities today, communities have long needed tools to improve 
bank practices at the local level.6  CIRC is an attempt to build on this 
history with a new approach—based on transparency and consumer 
power—to improving bank practices at the local level. 
A series of questions inspired the creation of CIRC: since 
regulating financial institutions is a complex task, and one that generally 
requires deep expertise, is there a way that consumers can encourage 
such institutions to be more responsive without having to become 
regulatory experts themselves?  Are there simple to understand metrics 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 8–12. 
 5. This state of affairs has led some to take action.  For a discussion of some of 
these initiatives, including Move Your Money campaign and Bank Transfer Day, see 
infra text accompanying notes 13–16.  
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
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that the typical consumer can use to differentiate among bank products 
and services and compare banks to each other?  Will consumers use 
these metrics when deciding where to bank?  And can consumer 
behavior in turn influence bank behavior by encouraging a “race to the 
top,” wherein banks alter their practices in order to raise their respective 
scores, attract consumers, and thereby gain market share?  CIRC is 
premised on the belief that each of these questions can be answered in 
the affirmative. 
CIRC was undertaken by the city of New Haven in collaboration 
with the Community & Economic Development Clinic at Yale Law 
School.7  The central motivating principle behind the project is the belief 
that providing consumers with basic information about the products and 
services that banks offer will encourage these banks to be more 
responsive to community needs.  This motivating principle is in turn 
inspired by several working presumptions.  The first such presumption 
is that the typical consumer cares about bank practices when choosing 
where to bank, including fees assessed, the range of web-based services 
offered, branch locations and hours, and local lending practices.  The 
second presumption is that consumers, armed with this information, will 
shop around and choose a bank that offers more flexible and accessible 
products and services.  The third presumption is that banks will respond 
by striving to improve the range of products and services they offer. 
This paper provides a detailed overview of the methodology behind 
the CIRC initiative and places the project in its historical context.  With 
these goals in mind, it is organized as follows.  Part I initially provides 
an overview of the extent to which the American public trusts, or does 
not trust, the financial sector.  It then describes efforts to improve such 
trust through legislation, including the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. At the time this project was conceived and executed, author Raymond Brescia 
co-taught the Community & Economic Development Clinic at Yale Law School and 
author Sonia Steinway was a student in the clinic.  Other students were also involved in 
the development of the CIRC project, including Yale Law students Lindsey Counts, Su 
Da, Elizabeth Kelly, Ming-Yee Lin, and Jin-Kang Nah; Yale School of Management 
students David Bisson, Katy Davis, Liz Greenberg, and Jen Leybovich; University of 
Connecticut School of Law student Bret Kupfer; and University of Michigan Law 
School student Seth Mohney.  The authors are also grateful for the support of officials 
from the City of New Haven who were instrumental to the project, including New 
Haven Mayor John DeStefano, Elizabeth Benton, Rebecca Bombero, and Rosemarie 
Lemley. 
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the Community Reinvestment Act, and the recent financial reform 
legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act.  Finally, it introduces some alternative 
approaches to the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), including the 
rise of so-called “Responsible Banking Ordinances” in municipalities 
across the United States. 
Part II highlights the value of market actor transparency in 
informing consumer behavior, as well as the importance of 
communicating information in accessible and understandable ways.  As 
an element of this discussion, this Part addresses the usefulness of the 
technique of indexing.  It then turns to several examples of existing 
consumer financial indexes.  Finally, Part II discusses the need for an 
index that communicates local information to consumers regarding the 
banks that operate in their respective communities. 
Part III provides a detailed overview of the CIRC index itself, 
including the metrics used, the relative weights assigned to them, and 
the point values distributed under the system.  This Part also summarizes 
the results of our analysis of banks operating in the city of New Haven. 
The final section, Part IV, explores ways that CIRC can be 
replicated in other communities, including alternative criteria for 
inclusion. 
I. THE NEED FOR TRUST IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND EFFORTS TO 
PROMOTE SUCH TRUST THROUGH LEGISLATION 
A. TRUST AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The American public’s trust in banks has hit a record low, 
according to the results of a recent Gallup poll.8  According to Gallup, 
just 21% of Americans have faith in the nation’s banks, the lowest 
recorded number since the poll was first taken in 1973.9  According to 
the Financial Trust Index,10 while few Americans trust national banks, 
particularly banks in which the government has a stake, trust in local 
banks and credit unions is relatively robust with 55% and 63% of 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. Jacobe, supra note 1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Financial Trust Index is a joint project of the Kellogg School of 
Management at Northwestern University and the Chicago Booth School of Business at 
the University of Chicago. See About, CHICAGO BOOTH/KELLOGG SCHOOL FINANCIAL 
TRUST INDEX, http://www.financialtrustindex.org/about.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 
2012). 
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Americans trusting these institutions, respectively.11  A recent op-ed by 
Ron Lieber of the New York Times captures the recent events that have 
shaken the public’s faith in the financial system: 
This week, the funky trading programs at Knight Capital sent many 
stock prices scattering. While most individual investors were not 
hurt, the company, a major player in stock trading, is reeling. 
The breakdown at Knight comes on the heels of—well, take your 
pick. The trading debacle at JPMorgan?  The Libor-fixing scandal? 
The Facebook initial public offering?  The customer restitution that 
Capital One is paying for what the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau said was deceptive credit card marketing? 
It’s enough to give credence to the people who want nothing to do 
with the profit-making players of the American financial system.12 
This drop in confidence in the financial system, most notably the 
public’s lack of faith in large, national banks, has given rise to at least 
two new grassroots movements, Bank Transfer Day and the Move Your 
Money project.  Consumer activist Kristen Christian started Bank 
Transfer Day in 2011 after growing frustration with fees at large banks, 
particularly Bank of America.13  The goal of the movement, as the name 
implies, is to convince consumers to transfer their accounts from large 
banks to small banks and credit unions, and thereby ultimately 
incentivize larger banks to lower their fees and otherwise become more 
consumer-friendly.14  The movement appears to have been successful; 
Bank of America, whose proposal to raise fees started as a catalyst for 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Results: Wave 15, CHICAGO 
BOOTH/KELLOGG SCHOOL FINANCIAL TRUST INDEX (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.financialtrustindex.org/resultswave15.htm.  Similar to the Gallup poll cited, 
the Financial Trust Index found trust in national banks at 23% and trust in banks in 
which the federal government had a stake at 21%. Id. at fig.2. 
 12. Ron Lieber, A Financial Plan for the Truly Fed Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2012, 
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/your-money/asset-allocation/a-
financial-plan-for-the-truly-fed-up-your-money.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 13. See Aaron Passman, How Kristen Christian Came To Launch Bank Transfer 
Day, 15 CREDIT UNION J., no. 49, 2011 at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 26185840. 
15_50/how-kristen-christian-came-to-launch-bank-transfer-day-1011578-1.html. 
 14. See id. 
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the movement, ultimately agreed to eliminate some monthly fees.15  
Moreover, credit unions alone reportedly gained 40,000 new members 
on Bank Transfer Day itself, and 700,000 new members between 
September—when the movement was launched—and December of 
2011—after Bank of America announced its change of heart.16 
The Move Your Money project shares a similar goal with Bank 
Transfer Day: to convince consumers to move their accounts from large 
financial institutions to smaller banks and credit unions.17  However, its 
efforts go beyond Bank Transfer Day’s by providing information about 
how to move money and where to move it to.18  Blogger Arianna 
Huffington and others initiated the Move Your Money campaign as a 
direct response to the “Too Big to Fail” phenomenon.19  Her goal was to 
reform the financial system by encouraging consumers to switch from 
large national banks to smaller “Main Street” institutions.20  As with 
Bank Transfer Day, the Move Your Money campaign seems to have 
resonated with consumers; its website claims to have facilitated the 
transfer of over $296 million from large corporate banks.21 
Both Bank Transfer Day and the Move Your Money campaigns 
support consumers in choosing to transfer their funds from large, 
national banks to small, community institutions.  However, neither 
campaign offers sufficient tools to consumers to assess the quality of the 
institution to which they are supposed to transfer their funds.  While the 
Move Your Money campaign offers some assistance by providing a list 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. Candice Choi, Bank of America Nixes $5 Debit Card Fee, BUSINESS WEEK 
(Nov. 1, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9QO3NO80.htm. 
 16. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, MONTHLY CREDIT UNION ESTIMATES: OCTOBER 
2012 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.cuna.org/research/download/mcue.pdf; Press 
Release, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, Tens of Thousands Keep Pace, Join Credit Unions 
on ‘Transfer Day’ (Nov. 8, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.cuna.org/public/press/press-
release/issues/tens-thousands-keep-pace-join-credit-unions-transfer-day. 
 17. See MOVE YOUR MONEY PROJECT, http://moveyourmoneyproject.org (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2012). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Arianna Huffington & Rob Johnson, Move Your Money: A New Year’s 
Resolution, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Dec. 29, 2009, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/move-your-money-a-new-
yea_b_406022.html.  The Big Six national banks cited are: JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, 
Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Id. 
 21. See MOVE YOUR MONEY PROJECT, supra note 17. 
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of “approved” institutions based on an analysis by Institutional Risk 
Analytics, discussed below, consumers are mainly left to assume that 
“smaller and more local is better.”22  Might there be a way to test this 
hypothesis, and a system through which consumers can comparison-
shop based on the products and services that banks offer?  It is to this 
topic that we will return in Part III, infra. 
The issue of the apparent lack of trust in financial institutions is a 
significant one, but it is not new.  While trust in financial institutions has 
been higher in recent memory, questions about the role of financial 
institutions in meeting community needs have plagued such institutions 
for generations.  Likewise, elected officials and regulators have 
attempted to legislate and regulate trustworthiness for decades.  The 
next section explores some of these efforts; first at the national level, 
dating back to the banking reforms passed in the wake of the Great 
Depression, straight through to the financial reform efforts implemented 
in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.  It then discusses more recent 
local efforts designed to ensure that banks are meeting local community 
needs. 
B. CAN TRUST IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM BE LEGISLATED? 
What role can legislative and regulatory oversight play in 
strengthening trust in the financial system?  One of the primary drivers 
of trust in the financial system is the provision of federal deposit 
insurance by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, created by the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.23  The history of banking in the United 
States leading up to the Great Depression is marked by cyclical bank 
“panics” during which bank depositors faced the prospect of losing their 
funds when bank investments failed.24  When consumer faith was 
shaken in a particular bank, customers might engage in a “run” on the 
bank, seeking to withdraw all of their deposits.25  The federal 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. See infra Part II.C.1. for a description of this system.  
 23.  Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1832 (2006)). 
 24. See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
 25. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 281–83 (David H. Romer & Justin 
Wolfers eds., 2010) (describing bank panics of the 19th century), available at 
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government established the system of federal deposit insurance to 
prevent such runs; if depositors knew their money was safe, and 
guaranteed by the federal government, the thinking went, they would not 
attempt to withdraw their funds at the first signs of weakness in a bank’s 
ledger sheet.26  This intervention, coupled with the FDIC’s safety and 
soundness examination, probably did more to instill a degree of trust in 
depository financial institutions than any other regulatory intervention in 
the financial sector. 
However, the FDIC did not guard against all banking practices that 
threaten to erode consumer trust.  In the 1960s and 70s, the Civil Rights 
Movement highlighted the legacy of discrimination in financial 
institutions.27  As a result, legislators enacted several laws to ensure that 
banks were meeting their obligations to all communities.28  For example, 
in 1968 Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), which banned 
discrimination in housing transactions, including mortgage lending.29 
Even with the passage of the FHA, fears remained that banks were 
still discriminating against communities of color, particularly in ways 
that were difficult to uncover.30  As a result, Congress stepped in again, 
first passing the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”)31 in 1975.  
HMDA requires that banks report to regulators on their mortgage 
lending practices and further, that those reports be made available to the 
public.32  The legislation was motivated by the belief that shining a light 
on bank lending practices would encourage banks to refrain from 
discriminatory lending.33 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_fall_bpea_papers/2
010b_bpea_gorton.pdf. 
 26. See Thomas A. Brooks, The Federal Deposit Insurance System: The Past and 
the Potential for the Future, 5 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 111, 111–12 (1986). 
 27. DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (2004). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266 (Apr. 15, 
1994) (indicating that FHA applies to mortgage discrimination). 
 30. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 27, at 98. 
 31. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2006). 
 32. Id. 
 33. For an overview of HMDA and its purposes, see Richard D. Marsico, Looking 
Back and Looking Ahead as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Turns Thirty-Five: The 
Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in a Time of Financial Crisis, 29 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 205 (2009). 
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With the release of the first round of HMDA data, newspapers 
across the country uncovered the degree of bank disinvestment and 
redlining that appeared to be taking place.34  In light of this information, 
Congress revisited the issue of bank practices in passing the Community 
Reinvestment Act.35  The CRA is the main legislative and administrative 
mechanism through which regulators monitor the extent to which banks 
are meeting the needs of low- and moderate-income communities.36  
Congress passed the CRA to fight two bank practices that had a harmful 
effect on local communities: “redlining,” the practice of excluding 
certain communities from lending products; and “capital exportation,” 
taking deposits from consumers in one community and using those 
funds to support economic development in other communities.37  The 
CRA was designed to be a “quid pro quo” with banks; because banks 
receive federal deposit insurance, they must in turn meet community 
needs.38  The relationship between deposit insurance and the CRA is 
explicit: only “depository institutions” are covered by its terms.39  
                                                                                                                                         
 34. Warren Dennis, The Community Re-Investment Act of 1977: Its Legislative 
History And Its Impact On Applications For Changes In Structure Made By Depository 
Institutions to the Four Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies 10 (Credit Reseach 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 24, 1978), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/ 
WP24.pdf. 
 35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006). 
 36. For an overview of the CRA, see Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It 
Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 523–
36 (2005). 
 37. Redlining is defined as “credit discrimination by a financial institution that 
refuses to make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999). For a discussion of the origins of redlining, which can 
be traced to federal agency practices during the 1930s, see KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 197–98 (1985); 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51–52, 199–201 (1993). For an argument that these 
agencies had little impact on any bank redlining practices, see Kristen B. Crossney & 
David W. Bartelt, The Legacy of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 16 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 547, 568–71 (2005). 
 38. 123 CONG. REC. 1958 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).  For a discussion of 
the link between the governmental benefits banks receive and the CRA, see Allen J. 
Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but 
Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 293 (1992) 
(citations omitted). 
 39. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (2006).  The CRA explicitly adopts the definition of 
“insured depository institution” set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1813, which provides that such 
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Furthermore, with a nod to preventing capital exportation, regulators 
only review bank practices within their CRA “assessment areas”: i.e., 
where they have branches and make a significant number of loans.40 
The goals of the CRA, HMDA, and FHA are undoubtedly laudable.  
Additionally, the predatory practices of unscrupulous mortgage lenders 
in communities of color during the subprime mortgage frenzy provide 
strong evidence that their protections are still relevant today.41  
However, there have been many major changes in the financial industry 
over the last thirty years. Consumers today typically have different 
relationships with their banks than they did in the 1960s and 70s.  
Moreover, the CRA, HMDA, and FHA were not necessarily designed to 
facilitate comparison-shopping by consumers, but rather to improve 
regulatory oversight.42  Banks too have changed, and some of the 
practices that civil rights statutes were designed to combat are far less 
prevalent today than they were in the 1970s.  Indeed, although redlining 
was the problem of that era, “reverse redlining,” or targeting certain 
communities for credit on unfair terms,43 has loomed as a much more 
serious problem over the last decade. 
                                                                                                                                         
an institution is “any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by 
the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation . . . .” Id. § 1813(c)(2) (2006). 
 40. 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2012). 
 41. Recent high profile investigations and settlements related to discrimination in 
lending reveal that mortgage lending, particularly during the subprime mortgage frenzy 
of the last decade, had a particularly racial undertone, and thus the continuing need for 
the FHA and its protections seems apparent.  See Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will 
Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-
discrimination-charges.html (describing fair housing settlements with Wells Fargo and 
Countrywide Financial for reverse redlining in subprime lending).  
 42. There is no easy way for consumers to gather information related to a bank’s 
compliance with the HMDA, the CRA, and FHA.  HMDA data is complex, and 
difficult to gather.  Determining FHA compliance would require an ability to search 
court dockets for lending discrimination cases involving a particular bank.  While 
consumers could search the grades that banks receive under the CRA from their 
regulators, understanding the process through which regulators issue those grades can 
be a challenge. See Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers 
Regarding Community Reinvestment; Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 11642 (Mar. 11, 2010). 
 43. Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty 
to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1509 n.39 (2008) (defining the practice of reverse 
redlining). 
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Even in achieving its stated goals,44 the CRA lacks teeth.  Federal 
bank regulators grade covered banks on their overall CRA 
performance.45  They are then supposed to take CRA grades into account 
when banks seek regulatory approval of covered transactions.46  
However, regulators almost never actually reject bank applications on 
CRA grounds: from 1985 to 1999, regulators rejected only eight out of 
over 92,000 bank applications (.01%) due to failing CRA grades.47  A 
more recent study of bank applications filed with the Federal Reserve 
from 1988 through 2007 revealed that only .06% (again, eight 
applications) of over 13,000 applications were denied on any consumer-
related grounds.48 
Moreover, even if regulators were more likely to use the CRA to 
prevent banking transactions, the reality is that the scope of the CRA is 
too limited to meaningfully impact banking practices.49  Because of the 
CRA’s focus on depository institutions in specific assessment areas, it 
had no effect on much of subprime lending—the practice that was at the 
heart of the financial crisis.50  Indeed, by some estimates, 94% of 
subprime lending was beyond the scope of the CRA.51 
Some commentators have argued that the CRA is largely to blame 
for the financial crisis, but such positions are hard to square with 
                                                                                                                                         
 44. Under the CRA, federal bank regulators are to use their oversight authority “to 
encourage [financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities 
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such 
institutions.” 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2006). 
 45. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (2006). 
 46. Id. § 2903(a) (2006). 
 47. Barr, supra note 36, at 586 n. 342 (citing TREASURY DEP’T, APPLICATIONS 
SUBJECT TO CRA THAT WERE PROTESTED ON CRA GROUNDS (2000)). 
 48. Foreclosures at the Front Step of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 63–64 (2007) (statement of Sandra Braunstein, 
Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs). 
 49. See Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The 
Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 642–45 
(2009). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Memorandum from Glenn Canner & Neil Bhutta, Div. of Research and 
Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to Sandra Braunstein, Dir., 
Consumer & Cmty. Affairs Div., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3 (Nov. 21, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203 
_analysis.pdf. 
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reality.52  Nevertheless, even though it did not cause the financial crisis, 
the CRA, and the regulators who enforce it, certainly did not prevent the 
present crisis, nor did they prevent the predatory lending that has 
devastated low- and moderate-income communities in the wake of the 
financial crisis and the foreclosure crisis that is still being played out.  
And to return to our theme of trust in financial institutions, it is hard to 
argue that the CRA, weak as it appears to be, has done much to restore 
faith in financial institutions. 
Although a law from the 1970s cannot be expected to engender 
faith in financial institutions today given the dramatic changes in the 
financial sector in the last thirty-five years, Congressional action in 2010 
was explicitly designed to restore faith in financial institutions and the 
financial market.53  It is to that legislation that we will now turn. 
In July 2010, after months of negotiations and by a narrow margin, 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, more commonly known as “Dodd-Frank” for its chief 
sponsors, Senator Christopher Dodd and Representative Barney Frank.54  
Throughout the negotiations of Dodd-Frank, many legislators and 
industry experts proclaimed the need to restore trust in the financial 
system.55  Indeed, as the Senate report on the legislation makes clear, 
                                                                                                                                         
 52. Addressing the question of what role the CRA may have played, if any, in the 
financial crisis is beyond the scope of this paper.  For a collection of some of these 
comments, see Brescia, supra note 49, at 626, n.43. 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
 54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various titles of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank].  A year before the passage of Dodd-Frank, the leaders of the G-20 issued a 
statement of principles that were supposed to guide global efforts at financial reform.  
In the “Global Plan for Recovery and Reform: The Communiqué from the London 
Summit,” the leaders vowed to take several steps towards improving financial sector 
transparency and regulation.  One of the six steps that needed to be taken included 
“strengthen[ing] financial regulation to rebuild trust.” See G-20, London Summit - 
Leader’s’ Statement 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/ 
pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf. 
 55. See, e.g., The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications 
for Consumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 26 (2009) 
(statement of Michael Barr, Assistant Secretar’y for Financial Institutions, Dep’artment 
of Treasury) (“We must restore honesty and integrity to our financial system, in order to 
restore trust and confidence.”); Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of 
Securities Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs – Part II, 111th Cong. 166 (2009) (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman 
2013] SCORING THE BANKS 353 
 
one of the purposes of the legislation was to restore such faith: “We 
must restore responsibility and accountability in our financial system to 
give Americans confidence that there is a system in place that works for 
and protects them.”56  The legislation included a wide range of reforms 
designed to strengthen regulatory oversight of the financial system. 
Among other reforms, it created the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, a new federal agency designed to ensure that financial products 
and services are safe and effective.57  The legislation also mandates the 
formation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, an inter-agency 
entity designed to facilitate the sharing of information across agencies 
and departments, and to provide regulators a better view of systemic 
risks.58 
A full review of the reforms instituted by Dodd-Frank is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say, as the previous discussion makes 
clear, if one of the purposes of the Dodd-Frank legislation was to restore 
faith in the financial system, the current state of public opinion would 
clearly suggest that in the two years since its passage, the legislation has 
not yet met that goal. 
C. EXPLORING LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO REIN IN RISKY BANKING 
PRACTICES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE INTRODUCTION OF RESPONSIBLE 
BANKING ORDINANCES 
In general, bank regulation is a matter for state and federal, not 
local, governments. In recent years, however, a number of cities have 
also attempted to shape the behavior of financial institutions by passing 
ordinances designed to ensure that banks are providing “responsible 
loans, investments, and services for modest-income and minority 
                                                                                                                                         
& Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) (“Creating a 
system of consistent standards and vigorous oversight of financial professionals —no 
matter which license they hold—would enhance investor protection and help restore 
trust in our markets.”). 
 56. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY 
OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_ 
Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf. 
 57. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010). 
 58. Id. § 111(a). 
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neighborhoods.”59  For many local communities, bank practices have 
had a serious impact on the municipal bottom line.  Predatory lending 
practices, and the foreclosures that often follow, reduce municipal 
coffers by lowering property values for both foreclosed homes and 
neighboring properties, which in turn reduces the tax base.60  Moreover, 
such practices often force municipalities to expend diminishing 
resources to monitor foreclosed properties that frequently become a 
magnet for crime, including prostitution, arson, and drug dealing.61  
Since municipalities bear the brunt of improper financial practices, local 
officials have sought ways to rein in this conduct.62  One promising 
approach lies in municipal market power: since cities invest billions in 
pension funds, tax proceeds, and operating accounts, advocates argue 
that they can use this market power to encourage banking practices that 
support local reinvestment and priorities.63 
In recognition of their power as market actors, several localities 
have used local legislation—“responsible banking ordinances”—to 
direct municipal business toward more community-friendly banks.64 
These responsible banking ordinances have taken various forms.  A 
typical ordinance mandates that a financial institution submit a detailed 
plan outlining the volume of both the home loans and small business 
loans it will make within the city, particularly in low- and moderate-
                                                                                                                                         
 59. See Background on Local Responsible Banking Ordinances, Nat’l Comty. 
Reinvestment Coal. (“NCRC”), http://www.ncrc.org/get-involved/hot-issues-take-
action/item/754-responsible-banking-ordinances (last visited Dec. 24, 2012). 
 60. See DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, THERE GOES 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON 
PROPERTY VALUES 2 (2005), available at http://ftp.nw.org/network/ 
neighborworksprogs/foreclosuresolutions/reports/documents/TGTN_Report.pdf. 
 61. See WILLIAM C. APGAR ET AL., HOMEOWNERSHIP PRES. FOUND., THE 
MUNICIPAL COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY 10–11 (2005), available 
at http://www.995hope.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Apgar_Duda_Study_Full_ 
Version.pdf. 
 62. In addition to the local banking ordinances described here, see infra text 
accompanying notes 65–84, some cities, like Baltimore, have filed suits over what are 
alleged to be discriminatory lending practices that led to foreclosures and a diminished 
tax base.  For a discussion of the Baltimore suit, see Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime 
Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in 
Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164 (2009). 
 63. See NCRC, REPORT FROM A NATIONAL CONVENING ON LOCAL RESPONSIBLE 
BANKING ORDINANCES, 8 (2011), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/ 
research/anhd_2011craconveningreport_7.13.2012.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
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income areas, before it can be awarded a city contract.65  Financial 
institutions are then required to report their actual performance to the 
municipal government, where the city staff can compare the institution’s 
goals to its actual performance and then make that information public.66  
Based on the data gathered, the municipality then decides with which 
banks the city will do business.67 
Cleveland, Ohio enacted the first responsible banking ordinance in 
1990, long before the current crisis.68  It is considered the basis for 
subsequent initiatives, as well as many of the ordinances being 
considered today.69 
In Cleveland, a bank must propose a four-year responsible banking 
plan which then must be approved by the city’s Director of Community 
Development before the bank is eligible to contract with the city.70  
When the city awards contracts, financial institutions are judged on a 
point system, which includes such factors as: “how close they came to 
meeting various lending and investing goals, how many branches they 
opened in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and how many 
minorities and women they employ in executive positions.”71 
When the ordinance was first enacted, both small and large banks 
believed that compliance with the new reporting system would be too 
costly, and many anticipated that they would give up on city business 
altogether rather than comply with the new rules.72  In the years 
following the ordinance, however, many banks that stayed in Cleveland 
remained stable, and the city’s percentage of under-banked and un-
banked residents is lower than the national average, likely a testament to 
the ordinance’s focus on assisting underserved communities.73 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. See Ryan Holeywell, Cities Using Deposits to Gain Leverage Over Banks, 
GOVERNING: THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (May 2, 2012), http://www.governing.com/ 
blogs/view/responsible-banking-ordinances-2012.html. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. John Farley, “Q&A with Cleveland on Responsible Banking Law, New in NYC, 
METROFOCUS (May 25, 2012, 4:00 AM),” http://www.thirteen.org/metrofocus/2012/05/ 
qa-with-cleveland-on-responsible-banking-law-new-in-nyc/. 
 69. See id.  
 70. Holeywell, supra note 65, at 1.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2.  
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In 2002, Philadelphia enacted its own ordinance, similar to 
Cleveland’s.74  In contrast to the Cleveland statute, through which a 
review committee evaluates bank plans and determines which banks are 
to receive municipal business, Philadelphia vests the power to enforce 
the statute solely with the City Treasurer.75  Another difference between 
the two statutes is that Philadelphia does not mandate that the banks’ 
plans and annual data reports be made available to the public.76  Despite 
these differences, the main objective of the ordinances in both cities is 
the same: to require banks to propose and undertake viable reinvestment 
plans for a multi-year period.77 
Following the effects of the most recent financial crisis, coupled 
with the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement, advocates and 
elected officials in several other major cities including New York, Los 
Angeles, Boston, and Pittsburgh began clamoring to enact their own 
local ordinances.78 
In 2010, the City Council of Los Angeles unanimously approved a 
responsible banking ordinance.79  Like its predecessors, the Los Angeles 
ordinance creates a process for gathering and publicizing information 
about the history of service in the community, which is then used to 
determine if the bank can bid on city contracts.80  Some of the 
information that the city plans to gather under the ordinance includes: 
how many branches each bank operates in underserved Los Angeles 
communities, how many times each bank has worked with homeowners 
to prevent foreclosures, and how many small business loans each bank 
would approve in the city.81  Not only will the information gathered be 
available to the council members when banks bid on city business in the 
future, it will also be available to the public so that individual consumers 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. See NCRC, SUMMARY OF LOCAL RESPONSIBLE BANKING ORDINANCES, 1 
(2012), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/research/summary_ 
responsiblebank.pdf. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Richard Alarcon, Responsible Banking is Responsible Government, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-
alarcon/responsible-banking_b_1301026.html. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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will have the resources to make well-informed decisions when choosing 
where to bank.82 
On the same day that the Los Angeles City Council passed its 
ordinance, the City Council of New York City passed its own.83  
Currently, the city of New York invests billions of dollars of city 
deposits with thirty-one different financial institutions; New York City’s 
ordinance will require all institutions seeking approval to contract with 
the city to be overseen by a new advisory council that will review 
banks’84 lending to affordable housing projects as well as their handling 
of foreclosures.  Although New York City’s ordinance has been passed 
by the City Council, it has yet to go into effect.85 
Subsequently, other major cities such as Pittsburgh, Seattle, 
Portland, Kansas City, and Boston have either enacted or are 
considering their own legislation.86 
Despite the promise of these local ordinances in influencing 
banking practices, it is unclear whether they touch on some of the most 
pertinent issues to consumers.  The Bank Transfer Day campaign, for 
example, was launched in response to high consumer banking fees, 
which are not addressed by any of the local ordinances.87  Furthermore, 
the responsible banking ordinances, as currently drafted, only empower 
local authorities to assess the extent to which financial institutions 
appear to be meeting community needs, with little guidance as to what 
those needs might be.  In the next section, we will discuss what 
consumers appear to want from banks, and explore how such consumer 
sentiment might be translated into an easy-to-access system that would 
permit consumers to compare across financial institutions. 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. See id. 
 83. See Willy Staley, New York City Passes Responsible Banking Law, Bloomberg 
Plans to Veto, MY BANK TRACKER (May 16, 2012), http://www.mybanktracker.com/ 
news/2012/05/16/new-york-city-passes-responsible-banking-law-bloomberg-plans-
veto/. 
 84. See Kate Taylor, New York Council Wants Banks to Describe Efforts in Poor 
Areas, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/nyregion/ 
council-wants-banks-to-describe-efforts-made-in-poor-areas.html.  
 85. See SUMMARY OF LOCAL RESPONSIBLE BANKING ORDINANCES, supra note 74, 
at 3. 
 86. Id. at 1. 
 87. See id. 
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II. PROMOTING CONSUMER-ORIENTED BANKING PRACTICES 
A. WHAT DO CONSUMERS WANT? 
The success of both the Bank Transfer Day and Move Your Money 
campaigns reveals that customers are dissatisfied with current banking 
options, and are willing to take action accordingly.88  In a global survey 
of over 18,000 banking customers, nearly 10% of consumers surveyed 
said they would consider changing financial institutions in the next six 
months.89  The top reasons for moving their business to other institutions 
included quality of service (53%), fees (50%), and ease of use (49%).90 
One survey estimated that 5.6 million Americans switched banks in 
the fourth quarter of 2011, and of those, 26% claimed high fees 
convinced them to switch.91 
Apart from lower fees, consumers are also looking for banks that 
provide personal service.92  In a Cisco bank consumer survey, 65% of 
respondents said they would favor bank branches that offered a wider 
range of services.93  Despite the growing popularity of online banking, 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. CAPGEMINI & EFMA, 2012 WORLD RETAIL BANKING REPORT (2012), available 
at http://www.capgemini.com/insights-and-resources/by-publication/world-retail-
banking-report-2012/. 
 89. Id. at 8. 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. Jim Van Dyke, ‘Bank Transfer Day’, What Really Just Happened?, JAVELIN 
STRATEGY & RESEARCH BLOG (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/ 
blog/2012/01/26/%E2%80%98bank-transfer-day%E2%80%99-what-really-just-
happened/.  These findings are consistent with other findings that show consumers are 
opposed to banking fees.  In one consumer survey sponsored by Ally Bank, 84% of 
respondents said that they did not believe it was acceptable for banks to charge a fee for 
checking, 79% did not believe banks should charge a monthly account maintenance fee, 
and 77% believed that banks should not charge for ATMs. Press Release, Ally Bank, 
Ally Bank Survey Explores Consumer Sentiment on Bank Fees’ (Nov. 10, 2011), 
available at http://media.ally.com/index.php?s=43&item=499. 
 92. Jorgen Ericsson et al., Winning Strategies for Omnichannel Banking: Cisco 
IBSG Global Research Reveals New Ways for Banks to Prosper in an Omnichannel 
World, CISCO, 3 (2012), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/Cisco-IBSG-
Omnichannel-Study.pdf. 
 93. Press Release, Cisco Study: Consumers Want Banks to Offer More 
Personalized Access to Financial Services (June 20, 2012), http://newsroom.cisco.com/ 
press-release-content?type=webcontent&articleId=910154. 
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“two-thirds (66 percent) of U.S.-based customers see their local branch 
as the most vital link with their bank, second only to cash machines.”94 
Potentially as a result of their desires for lower fees and more 
personalized services, consumer satisfaction surveys indicate that 
consumers are more satisfied with small banks and credit unions than 
large commercial banks.95  “Credit unions scored a record high 87, on a 
100-point scale, in the latest American Customer Satisfaction Index.”96  
On the other hand, “banks lost ground by some 1.3% to score 75, where 
they stood from 2003 to 2005 and again in 2008 and 2009.”97  The 
scores were calculated based on a survey of 70,000 consumers and their 
experiences with personal banking services such as checking, savings, 
and personal loans.98 
Is there a way to connect these consumer needs with actual banking 
practices?  The next section explores how the issues that consumers care 
most about—fees, interest rates, and customer service—could be 
incorporated into an easily accessible system that tells consumers how 
well banks are addressing those issues, , and permits consumers to 
comparison shop between banks.  This ability to comparison-shop 
would provide critical information to both consumers and banks as to 
what products and services are available in the market, allowing the 
former to shop around and encouraging the latter to improve the range 
of products and services they offer. 
B. TRANSLATING CONSUMER DESIRES INTO USABLE DATA TO BUILD 
TRUST AND IMPROVE BANK PERFORMANCE 
There have been some calls for a more “command-and-control” 
style regulatory regime in finance; i.e. through the return of the Glass-
Steagall Act, which separated commercial from investment banking, or 
simply by placing a cap on the size of banks in order to limit the “Too 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. Local Touch Should Be Key to Banks’ Future Plans, DESTINATION CRM (Apr. 
17, 2012), http://www.destinationcrm.com/Articles/CRM-News/Daily-News/Local-
Touch-Should-Be-Key-to-Banks-Future-Plans-82021.aspx. 
 95. Jennifer Waters, Credit Unions Trounce Big Banks in Consumer Survey, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 16, 2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-12-16/finance/ 
30714772_1_smaller-banks-credit-unions-small-banks. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Big to Fail” problem.99  However, like much consumer finance 
regulation, Dodd-Frank takes a disclosure-based approach in the 
apparent belief that providing sufficient information to consumers is 
enough to keep banks in line.100  In order for such a regime to work, 
though, the disclosure must be easy to understand and accessible to the 
average consumer.101  Full transparency of every piece of information 
related to the modern financial system will not necessarily prove useful 
to the average consumer, nor will it necessarily lead to greater trust in 
that system.  When disclosures are salient and accessible they can help 
foster trust that a given system is working the way in which it is 
intended, giving us confidence not only that we are being treated fairly, 
but also that those in whom we have placed our trust are engaging in 
ethical and lawful behavior.  Particularly in the area of finance, 
transparency is central to trust, and the financial crisis has revealed the 
connection between a lack of transparency and a lack of trust in 
financial institutions and financial regulators alike.102 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. For a discussion of some of the regulatory alternatives available to address the 
“Too Big to Fail” problem, see Jason Rudderman, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: 
How a Systemic Risk Premium Can Solve “Too Big to Fail,” 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 
39 (2012). 
 100. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 
2. 
 101. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CONGDON, JEFFREY R. KLING & SENDHIL 
MULLAINATHAN, POLICY AND CHOICE: PUBLIC FINANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 126 (2011) (arguing that a consumption tax on gasoline must 
be understood by consumers if it is to have the desired impact of reducing carbon 
emissions). 
 102. For an overview of the importance of trust in the financial sector, see Ronald J. 
Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 577 (2010); see 
also Randolph C. Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making 
of a Global Financial Crisis, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 51, 57 (2008) (“[B]ecause 
financial institutions handle other people’s money, the conduct of these institutions 
must instill trust through transparency.”). See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONG. 9 (Oct. 26, 
2010) [hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, OCT. 2010], available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/October2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Con
gress.pdf (“Treasury’s unfortunate insensitivity to the values of transparency has led it 
to engage in conduct that risks further damaging public trust in Government.”); Speech, 
Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary,  Introducing the Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
tg18.aspx (noting the connection between transparency and trust in the financial 
system).  According to Alix Partners, a business consulting firm, transparency is one of 
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In his recent work on the interaction between regulation and 
outcomes, Cass Sunstein points to the importance of salience, 
transparency, and accessibility in designing disclosure-based 
regulations.103 
A central point is that disclosure policies should be based on an 
understanding of how people process information.  For example, 
summary disclosure will not be helpful if it is ambiguous or unduly 
complex, or if it uses a scale that is not meaningful to consumers.104 
But disclosure by itself is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that 
information is accessible, valuable, and actionable for the average 
consumer. 
As social scientists have emphasized, disclosure as such may not be 
enough; it is important to consider how, not only whether, disclosure 
occurs.  Clarity and simplicity are often critical.  In some cases, even 
accurate disclosure of information may be ineffective if the 
information is too abstract, vague, detailed, complex, poorly framed, 
or overwhelming to be useful.105 
One effective way to translate a range of information into an easily 
accessible tool is through an index.  Indices, which combine a range of 
data points into a single scale or grade, have proven effective in 
translating a large amount of information into an easily accessible and 
easy-to-use format.106  In particular, indices are a common way of 
                                                                                                                                         
the four “foundational building blocks of consumer trust” for financial institutions 
(along with engagement, reliability, and “championing”).  Whether rates and fees are 
communicated in an easy to understand fashion is an important component of this 
transparency. Alix Partners, The Consumer Trust Imperative: Understanding—and 
Acting on—Trust as a Key Performance Driver, ALIX QUARTERLY 3–4 (2012). 
 103. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 
(2011). 
 104. Id. at 1366. 
 105. Id. at 1369 (footnote omitted). 
 106. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION 
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 34 (2009) (“Rankings get more political traction 
than the alternatives, precisely because they reduce the data to their simplest form.”); 
DAVID ROODMAN, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING AND RUNNING AN 
EFFECTIVE POLICY INDEX: LESSONS FROM THE COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2 
(2006), available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/6661 
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presenting information to consumers.  Examples include the Air Quality 
Index,107 measures of Gross Domestic Product, and the Consumer Price 
Index.108  Recently, the New York City Department of Health began 
issuing letter grades to restaurants based on their compliance with local 
health codes; the letter grade is essentially the product of an index, a 
compilation of a wide data set regarding restaurant practices.109 
Indices are especially prevalent in the world of finance, where 
massive quantities of data often figure into complex decision making.  
For example, there is the Financial Trust Index, described earlier.  The 
methodologies employed by credit rating agencies110 and property 
appraisers111 are likewise indices.  In addition, investments in stock 
markets around the globe are often pegged to stock indices, including 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average.112 
As with any disclosure-based approach, the index itself must be 
transparent and salient to be effective. 
Composite indexes are useful tools for raising awareness of public 
policy issues.  To work well, they must combine humility with a 
                                                                                                                                         
(“Indexes, which distill large amounts of information into a few numbers, appear to be 
gaining popularity among policy advocates and researchers.”). 
 107. See U.S. Air Quality Status and Trends Through 2008, 20 AIR POLLUTION 
CONSULTANT 1.4 (2010) (discussing air quality index). 
 108. For information on the creation of the consumer price index, see Consumer 
Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm/ (last modified Oct. 19, 2011). 
 109. See N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Restaurant Inspection 
Information, NYC HEALTH, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/rii/index.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2012) (providing information on New York City’s restaurant grading 
system).  Similarly, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
issues its vehicle safety ratings, which combine a range of information into an easily 
accessible tool, ultimately producing a star rating for each vehicle indicating its relative 
safety. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.safercar.gov/Safety+Ratings (last visited Aug. 5, 2012).  
 110. Mark Adelson, Understanding Standard & Poor’s Rating Definitions, 917 
PLI/Comm 53, 58 (2009) (discussing credit ratings). 
 111. On the process of property appraisal, see David Geltner et al., Appraisal 
Smoothing and Price Discovery in Real Estate Markets, 40 URB. STUD. 1047 (2003).  
Of course, home values are then utilized in another, wildly popular index: the 
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index. See S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, S&P, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-
indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff—p-us—— (last visited Aug. 5, 2012). 
 112. For an overview of stock market indices, see Market Indices, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/indices.htm (last modified Oct. 15, 2012). 
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clear sense of purpose, and incorporate judicious trade-offs between 
considerations that range from philosophy to mathematics to science 
to communications strategy . . . Perhaps the greatest design 
challenge is the tension between the desire for simplicity and the 
complexity of policy, which can lead turn an index into a black box . 
. . In the end, the test of an index is not whether it is right, but 
whether it draws people in to the work of institution and a world of 
ideas.113 
Growing dissatisfaction with banks has led a number of outlets to 
create their own rating systems.114  Of the two that will be reviewed in 
the next section, one assesses and communicates the strength of and 
relative risk associated with financial institution ledgers, while another 
gauges the strength of financial institution investments in the 
community.  These will each be reviewed in turn below. 
C. THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METRICS TO GAUGE BANK PRACTICES 
There is no shortage of industry analysis of financial institution 
performance, safety, and soundness.  Such analysis is rarely geared 
towards the needs of the typical consumer, however.  This section 
highlights two analytic systems that attempt to assess the performance of 
banks in ways that consumers can appreciate.  As the following 
discussion shows, these systems rate banks on their overall performance 
and do not assess the extent to which any particular financial institution 
serves any particular community. 
1. Institutional Risk Analytics 
Institutional Risk Analytics (“IRA”) reviews the holdings of 
financial institutions to determine the relative risk associated with their 
total portfolios.115  It prepares reports on the risk profiles of many 
financial institutions and offers those reports to paying subscribers.116  
When the Move Your Money project was launched, IRA agreed to 
                                                                                                                                         
 113. ROODMAN, supra note 106, at 13. 
 114. See infra Part II.C. 
 115. See INSTITUTIONAL RISK ANALYTICS: CREATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS, http://us1.institutionalriskanalytics.com/www/index.asp (last visited Aug. 
5, 2012). 
 116. Id. 
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supply a modified version of its reports free of charge.117  Through a 
web-based tool, visitors to the Move Your Money website can generate 
a list of local banks that meet two criteria: small size (defined as less 
than $65 billion in assets) and a relatively strong portfolio of 
investments, according to IRA’s metrics.118  Because IRA’s information 
is proprietary and based on each financial institution’s entire ledger, the 
IRA bank ratings system is not geared toward assessing the practices 
and investments of a bank as they relate to any particular community.119 
2. National Community Investment Fund Social Performance Metrics 
The National Community Investment Fund (“NCIF”) is a not-for-
profit investment trust that works to bring financial services to 
underserved communities.120  It invests in what it terms Community 
Development Banking Institutions (“CDBIs”), financial institutions that 
provide financial products and services for the benefit of underserved 
communities and individuals.121  Some CDBIs are also certified as 
Community Development Financial Institutions (“CDFIs”), which 
enables them to receive Federal support, but requires compliance with 
U.S. Treasury reporting requirements.122  By definition, CDBIs are so-
called “double bottom line” institutions, “which seek to balance their 
profit making and their positive social impact.”123  Any financial 
institution can qualify as a CDBI if it receives a certain score under the 
NCIF system, regardless of the nature of the institution—whether it be a 
large, national bank, a or small, community-focused institution.124 
As part of their efforts to identify CDBIs and encourage allocations 
to socially responsible investments, NCIF has developed an assessment 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. Id. 
 118. See MOVE YOUR MONEY PROJECT, supra note 17.  
 119. See INSTITUTIONAL RISK ANALYTICS: CREATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS, supra note 115. 
 120. See About NCIF, NCIF, http://www.ncif.org/index.php/about/ (last visited Aug. 
5, 2012). 
 121. DAVID PORTEOUS & SAURABH NARAIN, SOCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
FOR CDFI BANKS (2007), available at http://www.ncif.org/images/uploads/SPM_for_ 
CDFI_Banks.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 2.  For information about the CDFI Fund, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FUND, 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 123. PORTEOUS & NARAIN, supra note 121, at 2. 
 124. See id. at 1–2.  
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tool that provides key information about the community development 
missions and programs of banks.125  Through this tool, Social 
Performance Metrics, the organization reviews the extent to which the 
activities of financial institutions address the needs of underserved 
communities.126  NCIF “has calculated the Social Performance Metrics 
value for every domestic bank and thrift from 1996 to the present.”127  
Through this system, NCIF combines financial performance information 
with social performance data to assess whether financial institutions are 
serving underserved communities.128  Their hope is that socially 
responsible investors will use these scores when making investment 
decisions.129 
For example, CDBIs must have at least 50% of their branches in 
low-to-moderate income (“LMI”) census tracts.130  NCIF’s system also 
requires CDBIs to have at least 40% of their HMDA reported loan 
originations and purchases (in dollars) located in LMI census tracts.131  
In order to provide investors with access to the data behind these 
metrics, NCIF has established a searchable database that allows 
investors to input their parameters for social and financial performance 
(as a function of return on investment) and receive a list of all entities 
meeting those criteria.132 
However, the NCIF system is not designed to assess local banking 
practices, because the metrics are only relevant to each bank’s national 
practices.133  Moreover, they do not incorporate the wide range of other 
consumer-related issues that may matter when choosing where to bank, 
including fees assessed.134 
                                                                                                                                         
 125. See NCIF Social Performance Metrics, NCIF http://www.ncif.org/index.php/ 
services/spm/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2012). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id.  
 130. SAURABH NARAIN & JOE SCHMIDT, “NCIF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE METRICS: A 
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO MEASURING THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF BANKS AND THRIFTS, 
AND TO INVESTING CAPITAL IN THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BANKING SECTOR” 6 
(2008), available at : http://www.ncif.org/images/uploads/NCIF_SPM.pdf. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 11. 
 133. See NCIF Social Performance Metrics, supra note 125. 
 134. See id. 
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D. THE NEED FOR A LOCAL APPROACH GEARED TOWARDS RESPONDING 
TO THE NEEDS OF LOCAL CONSUMERS AND COMMUNITIES 
Despite the positive efforts by IRA and NCIF, we are not aware of 
any existing index geared toward assessing the performance of banks in 
any particular community.  Each community is different, and the 
consumers that reside in it will likely have different needs.  For 
example, a college town such as New Haven needs more banking 
options for students.  A bank can saturate one market with branch 
locations, and fail to serve another.  Banks can build branches in certain 
neighborhoods within a community, and neglect others.  Bank personnel 
can speak the languages spoken by residents of the community, or not.  
Banks can place ATMs in accessible locations throughout a particular 
community, or choose to limit their availability to a few, select areas. 
Because the array of products and services that financial 
institutions offer can be dizzying, consumers need an easily accessible 
tool for identifying the ways in which local banks are responding, or not 
responding, to their particular needs.  While the efforts of IRA and 
NCIF are laudable, neither fills this specific gap.  The following section 
describes a new approach that attempts to fill the need for more 
consumer-oriented and community-focused information: CIRC.  CIRC 
was originally designed for the New Haven community, but is easily 
transferrable to other communities. 
III. THE COMMUNITY IMPACT REPORT CARD 
We designed CIRC to incorporate metrics that reflect the types of 
products and services consumers seem to care the most about today.  We 
rated each of New Haven’s eleven banks135 across thirty distinct 
categories, ranging from the percentage of Latino loan applicants 
approved in the city to the amount charged to bank customers in 
monthly service fees.  Our goals were to develop a series of metrics that 
would gauge the extent to which banks are meeting the needs of the 
New Haven community and to provide consumers with an easily 
accessible method for comparing banks along these metrics.  As the 
following discussion shows, we assigned point values in each category, 
with a total possible score of 100. 
                                                                                                                                         
 135. We determined which banks to review based on whether the bank had a 
physical consumer branch within city limits. 
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The data we considered falls into two basic categories: home loans 
and banking products/accessibility. 
Our home loan category is calculated based on data reported by 
banks to the federal government under HMDA.  We used HMDA data 
to assess each bank’s lending practices in New Haven along the 
following criteria: 
 The percentage of loan applications accepted – all applicants; 
 The percentage of loan applications accepted – Latino 
applicants; 
 The percentage of loan applications accepted – Black applicants; 
 The percentage of loans made to applicants with incomes below 
the county average; 
 The percentage of loans made in the city of New Haven 
compared to New Haven County; 
 The total value of loans originated in New Haven as a 
percentage of loans made by each institution nationally. 
 
Without being able to review the actual applications to determine a 
particular prospective borrower’s creditworthiness, it is impossible to set 
a particular benchmark for how many loans a bank should make in a 
particular community, what applicants it should approve and reject, and 
how much lending by volume it should do.  Accordingly, in order to 
gauge the practices of the banks we analyzed, we created metrics that 
assessed how the institutions measured up against each other.  For each 
category, we assessed the median for the sample set (eleven banks), then 
assigned point values as follows: 
 One point: the bank’s percentage was at least 20% below the 
median; 
 Three points: the bank’s percentage was within 20% of the 
median (above or below); 
 Five points: the bank’s percentage was at least 20% above the 
median. 
 
 
For example, the median percentage of home loan applications 
accepted in New Haven was 55.6%; 20% above and below the median 
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gave us a range of 44.4 to 66.7%.  Because there were six categories 
worth up to five points each, a total of thirty points was allocated in the 
home loan category (i.e., 30% of the total score).  Citibank had the most 
points in this section (twenty-six); People’s United and Sovereign tied 
for the least (eight). 
We used a range of 20% based on consultation with experts in the 
community banking field.  To ensure that this was an effective 
approach, we ran sensitivity analyses on that range.  Our results did not 
change if we used either a lower threshold (15%) or a higher one (25%); 
the banks had the same relationship to each other using either threshold, 
and no bank’s score changed by more than two points. 
We considered but ultimately did not include loan applicants’ 
gender as a category because there was no practical difference between 
the banks when using this criterion. 
Our banking products/accessibility category incorporates a variety 
of metrics that help differentiate between banks from the standpoint of 
New Haven consumers. For each bank, we collected136 the following 
data: 
 Physical accessibility: Number and location of branches in New 
Haven, hours open (e.g., Saturday/evening hours), online/mobile 
banking, multilingual staff at branches; 
 ATM locations and features: Number and location of bank 
ATMs in New Haven, multilingual functionality, fees charged to 
non-customers, fees charged to customers using non-bank 
ATMs; 
 Personal savings accounts: Monthly fee, minimum opening 
balance, minimum balance to avoid monthly fee; 
 Personal checking accounts: Monthly fee, minimum opening 
balance, minimum balance to avoid monthly fee, overdraft 
penalty; 
 Small business accounts: Monthly fee, minimum opening 
balance, transaction limit per month; 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. In all instances, data used in CIRC came from three sources: publicly available 
information (like that found on bank websites), site visits (to score categories like ATM 
language capabilities), and interviews with bank personnel (for information that was not 
readily available through public sources, like the languages spoken by bank personnel 
in a particular branch location).  We accepted self-reported information by the banks at 
face value, under the assumption that consumers were similarly privy only to a bank’s 
publicly-available information. 
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 Other: Acceptance of the ElmCity ID137 or alternative 
identification, personal loan options, check cashing services for 
non-customers, alternative products (e.g., student accounts) 
offered. 
 
Most of our categories were rated on a scale of one to three points, 
although two were graded on a binary scale (either one or two points).  
As a result, the total number of points available in this category was 
seventy, comprising 70% of the total grade. Bank of America and First 
Niagara tied for the most points in this section (fifty-one), and Wells 
Fargo had the least (thirty-nine).  The following tables show the point 
values assigned under each metric. 
Physical Accessibility 
 
 
Branch locations: 
number 
1: 1 New Haven branch; 
2: 2 New Haven branches; 
3: 3+ New Haven branches. 
Branch locations: 
geographic distribution 
1: 0-1 branch in an empowerment zones (based on HUD 
definition); 
2: 2 branches in empowerment zones; 
3: >2 branches in empowerment zones. 
Opening hours 1: No Saturday or evening hours (past 6 PM); 
2: Open either Saturday or evening hours; 
3: Open Saturday and evening hours (at least 1 branch). 
Online or mobile banking 1: Does not offer free online or mobile banking; 
2: Offers free online and/or mobile banking capability for 
checking and savings accounts.  
Multilingual staff 1: No staff members can speak a language other than 
English; 
2: Offers staff members at each branch who can converse 
in two languages; 
3: Offers staff members who can converse in more than 
two languages. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 137. The Elm City ID card is a photo identification card issued by the City of New 
Haven and available to all residents of the city, regardless of their immigration status.  
See ELMCITY RESIDENT CARD, http://www.newhavencard.net/nhcthome/IDCard.php 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2012).  
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ATM Locations and Features  
ATM locations: 
number 
1: 0-2 ATM facilities in city of New Haven; 
2: 3-4 ATM facilities in city of New Haven; 
3: 5+ ATM facilities in city of New Haven. 
ATM locations: 
geographic distribution 
1: 0-1 ATM in empowerment zones (based on HUD 
definition); 
2: 2 ATMs in empowerment zones; 
3: >2 ATMs in empowerment zones. 
Multilingual functionality 1: ATM offers services in English only; 
2: ATM offers services in English and Spanish only; 
3: ATM offers services in at least 3 languages, 
including English and Spanish. 
Non-bank customer fees 1: Greater than $2 fee per transaction for non-bank 
customers; 
2: No greater than $2 fee per transaction for non-bank 
customers; 
3: No fee per transaction for non-bank customers. 
Fee for using non-bank  
ATMs 
1: Greater than $2 fee per transaction for using non-
bank ATM; 
2: No greater than $2 fee per transaction for using non-
bank ATM; 
3: No transaction fee for using non-bank ATM. 
   
Financial Products   
Personal savings accounts: 
fee structure 
1: Bank charges $4.50 or more a month for savings 
accounts; 
2: Bank charges up to $4.50 a month for savings 
accounts; 
3: Bank offers no-cost savings accounts. 
Personal savings accounts: 
minimum opening balance 
1: More than $50 balance to open account; 
2: $11-50 balance to open account; 
3: Up to (and including) $10 minimum to open account. 
Personal savings accounts: 
minimum  no-fee balance 
1: Requires >$500 average monthly minimum balance 
or >$300 minimum balance at all times to avoid fees; 
2: Requires between $250 and $500 average monthly 
minimum balance or between $100 and $300 minimum 
balance at all times before incurring fees; 
3: Up to $250 average monthly minimum balance or 
minimum balance of $100 at all times without fees. 
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Personal savings accounts: 
account opening criteria 
1: Does not accept alternative forms of ID to open 
account; 
2: Accepts alternative forms of ID as secondary, but not 
primary, form of ID to open account; 
3: Accepts Elm City ID Card or other form of 
alternative ID to open account.  
Personal checking accounts: 
fee structure 
1: Bank charges $4.50 or more a month for checking 
accounts; 
2: Bank charges up to $4.50 for checking accounts; 
3: Bank offers no-cost checking accounts. 
Personal checking accounts: 
minimum opening balance 
1: More than $50 to open account; 
2: $26-50 to open account; 
3: Up to (and including) $25 minimum opening balance 
to open account. 
Personal checking accounts: 
minimum no-fee balance 
1: Requires >$750 average monthly minimum balance 
or >$500 minimum balance at all times to avoid 
incurring fees; 
2: Requires up to $750 average monthly minimum 
balance or $500 minimum balance at all times to avoid 
incurring fees; 
3: No minimum balance required. 
Personal checking accounts: 
overdraft penalties 
1: More than a $35 overdraft penalty per transaction; 
2: $26-35 overdraft penalty per transaction; 
3: Up to $25 overdraft penalty (average of first five 
overdrafts) per transaction. 
Personal loans  1: Offers no personal loan options; 
2: Offers an array of personal loans options. 
Check cashing: 
non-account holders 
1: Will not cash checks for non-account holders; 
2: Charges $5+ to cash checks for non-account holders; 
3: Charges up to $5 to cash checks for non-account 
holders or offers free check cashing for checks written 
from bank. 
Small business accounts: 
fee structure 
1: Bank charges >$10.00 for small business accounts; 
2: Bank charges up to $10.00 for small business 
accounts; 
3: Bank offers no-fee small business accounts. 
Small business accounts: 
minimum opening balance 
1: More than $100 to open account; 
2: $26-100 to open account; 
3: Up to $25 minimum balance to open account. 
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Small business accounts:  
usage criteria 
1: Fewer than 250 transactions permitted per month 
without charge; 
2: 250-400 transactions permitted per month without 
charge; 
3: Over 400 transactions permitted per month without 
charge or no maximum usage criteria.  
Alternative products 1: Does not offer alternative products; 
2: Offers only student accounts; 
3: Offers multiple alternative products (e.g., student 
accounts, last chance accounts, etc). 
 
We excluded several previously considered categories because 
banks scored similarly, and thus failed to generate meaningful 
differences between the practices of the banks: 
 Proximity to public transportation: all banks were within five 
minutes of a bus line; 
 Direct deposit: all banks offered free direct deposit to customers; 
 ATM services: all banks have at least one ATM in the city of 
New Haven that accepts deposits; 
 Usage criteria for personal savings accounts: all banks were 
similar in following federal regulations with respect to the limit 
of six transactions per month,138 although policies varied after 
that limit; 
 Usage criteria for personal checking accounts: none of the banks 
set limits on transactions for checking accounts; 
 Check cashing for account holders: none of the banks charged a 
fee to account holders, although some set limits on the amount 
of funds a customer could withdraw at one time; 
 Small business accounts opening criteria: none of the banks 
required applicants to undertake any additional steps/fulfill 
additional requirements beyond submitting necessary 
paperwork. 
 
Although there was variability in how banks scored on our index, 
no bank was perfect.  First Niagara, the top-rated bank, scored 74/100, 
meaning there are definitely opportunities for improvement.  At the 
same time, even People’s United, our lowest-rated bank with a score of 
fifty-two, scored well in at least some categories. 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. See so-called “Regulation D,” 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2) (2012). 
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Generally speaking, the results revealed several areas of concern in 
terms of bank practices in New Haven, including the following: 
 At all but one bank, Latino and Black home loan acceptance 
rates lag behind the overall acceptance rate in the city, some by a 
wide margin.139  At one bank (The Bank of Southern 
Connecticut), there were no Latino or Black applicants at all.  At 
two other banks, no Latino or Black applicants were approved 
(TD Bank and RBS Citizen’s, respectively). 
 Although all banks offer at least one branch open on Saturday, 
only two of the eleven banks offer evening hours (past 6 PM) 
and only one (TD Bank) is open on Sundays. 
 All banks charge non-bank customers a fee to use their ATMs, 
with the average fee close to $3 per transaction. 
 All but two banks (Citibank and People’s United) charge fees to 
their own customers for using non-bank ATMs, with the average 
fee around $2. 
 Only one bank (JPMorgan Chase & Co.) accepts the Elm City 
ID card to open an account. 
 All banks but one (First Niagara) charge monthly fees for 
checking accounts, with the average fee at around $9, and the 
average minimum balance to avoid fees at over $1,000. 
 
At the same time, our analysis yielded several encouraging findings 
regarding bank practices in New Haven, including the following: 
 All banks offer free online banking; only one (Wells Fargo) 
charges a fee for online bill pay. 
 All banks but one (The Bank of Southern Connecticut) have 
multilingual staff; at two banks (Citibank and Webster Bank), 
services are offered in multiple languages (i.e., not just Spanish 
and English). 
 All banks but one (The Bank of Southern Connecticut) have 
ATMs that offer services in languages other than English; 
roughly half offer services in multiple languages beyond 
Spanish and English. 
                                                                                                                                         
 139. The general home mortgage acceptance rate in the city is calculated by using 
HMDA data and determining the acceptance rate for all lenders in the city, regardless of 
whether they have a physical location in the city.  Thus, by our calculations, “resident” 
banks in the city have a lower home mortgage acceptance rate for Black and Latino 
borrowers than non-resident banks. 
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 All banks but one (Citibank) offer savings accounts with 
relatively low monthly fees ($5 and below). 
 Most banks will cash checks for non-customers, albeit often 
only for checks written on their own bank and/or for a fee. 
 Most banks offer alternative accounts, especially student 
savings/checking options. 
 
By creating a multifaceted index system that reflects the specific 
interests and needs of New Haven consumers, we believe that this 
system will enable New Havenites to compare banks and choose the one 
that best meets their needs.  In turn, our hope is that banks will respond 
to the index by improving their products and services.  By no means do 
we believe this is the only method through which consumer and bank 
behavior could be shaped.  Similarly, we do not believe our approach to 
metric setting, weighting, and scoring is the only way that a community 
could assess bank products and services.  In the next section, we 
describe some alternative methods and approaches that different 
communities can take, and some enhancements to our system that other 
communities might adopt. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND ENHANCEMENTS 
The CIRC system creates an objective set of criteria, weights and 
scores them with rough equivalence, and generates a single score out of 
100.  Of course, there are many alternative approaches.  The following 
discussion illuminates some of them and then touches upon some 
possible enhancements to our system. 
A. ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
While the variations are virtually endless, in this sub-section we 
will discuss potential alternative approaches around several central 
themes: setting objective criteria; identifying the range of metrics to 
score; establishing relative weights for the different scores; assigning 
different scores; issuing letter grades; and engaging in relative ranking. 
1. Objective Criteria and Relative Scoring 
In the CIRC system, we identified a series of metrics and 
determined an objective “ideal” under each criteria that we believe 
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represents the best practices in New Haven, such as the number of 
branches one could reasonably expect a bank to operate in a single 
community (three), the number of languages spoken by bank personnel 
(more than two), and the fee for cashing a check for a non-customer (no 
more than $5).  At the same time, we used relative ranking in assessing 
banks’ home lending practices because we believe it is impossible to 
define objective criteria about lending without reviewing each bank’s 
portfolio in-depth, with the caveat that we can identify some obvious red 
flags, like when a bank makes no loans to borrowers of certain 
demographics. 
Of course, our approach is not the only one a community could 
implement to evaluate its local banks.  Communities could choose to set 
higher goals for banks in the range of the products and services they 
offer, such as reserving the highest score for banks that provide no-fee 
checking and savings accounts.  Or they could set purely relative 
benchmarks: e.g., a community could grade each bank against all other 
local banks in terms of the fees they charge, or the array of services they 
provide. 
Similarly, just as we scored banks on their home lending practices 
relative to other banks in New Haven, communities could choose to set 
objective lending targets instead. 
2. Identifying Metrics 
We developed the criteria included in CIRC through discussions 
with industry experts, community leaders, regulators, and elected 
officials.  Communities could certainly choose different criteria, choose 
only some of the metrics utilized in CIRC, and/or add additional criteria 
beyond the scope of CIRC. 
3. Weighting 
Under CIRC, a bank’s scores on the products and services criteria 
comprise 70% of its overall score, with home lending scores accounting 
for the remaining 30%.  We assigned relatively equivalent weights 
within each larger category: i.e., banks could receive up to three points 
in most of the products and services categories, and up to two points in 
just two.  Similarly, each lending metric was given equal weight within 
the home mortgage category.  Different communities could assign 
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certain metrics higher or lower weights, assuming they were to use the 
same metrics as CIRC. 
4. Scoring 
Through CIRC, banks can earn a range of scores, typically one to 
three points, based on their relative success in meeting relevant 
benchmarks.  Communities can choose to vary the points assigned to the 
different metrics.  Under CIRC, banks that do poorly in a particular 
metric generally receive one point under each metric, even if, for 
example, their ATMs offer services in English only.  One simple 
variation a community could choose would be to assign no points to 
banks that fail to meet certain benchmarks in particular areas.  Similarly, 
while CIRC generally assigns one to three points in most products and 
services categories, a wider spread could be used. 
Communities could also vary the total number of points available 
(separate from, or in conjunction with, assigning different weights to 
different categories).  For the sake of simplicity, under CIRC, banks can 
achieve a total of 100 possible points.  Communities could obviously 
vary this number based on how they wish to assign points to each 
category.  They could achieve further variations in weighting by varying 
the total points available under each category. 
5. Assigning Individual Scores in Categories and Issuing Grades 
CIRC’s approach involves assigning a total score out of 100 points, 
but there is wide room for variation in assigning scores.  For example, 
other communities could assign a range of different scores in different 
categories; or they could take a different approach to issuing a single 
score by, for example, issuing an overall letter grade on bank 
performance.  These could be graded on a curve, relative to how all 
banks in a community fare, or they could be given grades based on pre-
determined benchmarks: e.g., a bank receiving a score of seventy-five or 
lower could receive no higher than a C grade. 
6. Relative Ranking and Tallying of Scores 
The CIRC approach to issuing final “grades” for the banks consists 
of tallying the point values each bank receives under each metric into a 
single, numerical score.  Individual consumers can also see the data 
2013] SCORING THE BANKS 377 
 
inputs that support those scores.  While the banks naturally sort into a 
“ranking” based on the overall score, the score itself is not a reflection 
of any relative rank of the banks themselves.  However, communities 
could choose different approaches to generating and presenting the final 
results of their scoring system. 
Another common approach to indexing involves generating the 
results of rankings and issuing a score based on relative ranking rather 
than on raw scores.  In other words, communities could assign 
numerical scores based on how banks rank relative to each other in a 
particular category (in our case, one through eleven), and then add those 
numerical scores under each category to arrive at a final score. 
B. ADDITIONAL ENHANCEMENTS 
Just as communities have many options from which to choose if the 
same categories as CIRC are used—namely, financial products and 
services and home lending—the number of possible categories of 
information that could go into each community’s system is also vast.  
This final section will discuss two potential enhancements that 
communities could consider, and which CIRC may undertake in future 
iterations of the project: (1) incorporating national information and (2) 
creating a user-directed interface to enable consumers to create their 
own individualized scoring systems. 
Communities can choose to incorporate a range of publicly 
available information about financial institutions, from national lending 
criteria available through HMDA to 10-K filings for publicly traded 
institutions.  Different incarnations of a bank rating system could use 
some or all of these national data points to enhance the range of 
information provided to consumers.  Of course, doing so may detract 
from the purely local focus, but particular communities may nonetheless 
choose to do so in order to capture this additional information. 
In addition, with appropriate technical expertise, communities 
could create an end-user focused, web-based platform that would 
empower consumers to make their own decisions on the shape of the 
system, tailoring it to best meet their own needs.  For example, such a 
web-based platform could enable consumers to choose the criteria to 
include in their personal bank scorecards, assign points and weighting 
accordingly, and thus generate personalized scores for each bank.  If a 
particular consumer is less interested in bank fees or home mortgage 
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lending, for example, he or she could jettison those criteria from the 
scorecard; similarly, that consumer could assign greater weight to small 
business lending categories and deemphasize the languages spoken by 
bank personnel at local branches. 
The possibilities for such a web-based, consumer-customized 
interface are virtually infinite, and it is our hope that future iterations of 
CIRC, and other communities’ approaches to it, will include such 
options. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in the introduction to this piece, a series of questions 
inspired the creation of CIRC.  Can consumers put pressure on banks to 
be more responsive without any particular expertise in bank regulation?  
Can consumers use a series of easily understood metrics to gauge bank 
responsiveness to consumer needs and interests?  Can banks’ scores on 
these metrics permit comparison-shopping by consumers?  If consumers 
do use these metrics, will banks respond by improving the products and 
services they offer?  The CIRC project described in this article is an 
attempt to develop an easy-to-use system to provide consumers with the 
information they need to compare banks operating in the New Haven 
community.  In turn, our hope is that banks will respond to informed 
consumer behavior by enhancing their customer services: improving 
their products and taking a more proactive—and better-informed—
approach to meeting consumer interests and addressing community 
needs. 
 
